Latin America and East Asia:
A comparison of their Politcal Economies

In this essay we shall be comparing and contrasting the regions of Latin America, the nations of North and South America where the romance languages are spoken south of the USA, and East Asia, defined here as the Asean + 3. In comparing and contrasting these two regions we will identify the main features of their respective political economies. By examining each region separately we shall look at the historical development of both regions, starting with their first contact with the European powers through the cold war up to the contemporary setting. In the case of Latin America this shall focus on the battle between the forces of first colonialism then neo-liberalism versus various social movements, from Bolivar to Chavez, that have emerged over the last two centuries. While in the case of East Asia we shall begin with the colonial experience and the ensuing fragmentation of its the sinocentric system, continuing through the cold war to the contemporary environment where new shared experiences have fostered a new regional agenda.
Latin America, a highly civilized region at the time, first came into contact with the European powers in the late15th century with the discovery by Columbus, for the Spanish crown, of the West Indies. Within a short time most of Latin America was under the control of the Spanish, with Portugal taking Brazil. (Calvert 1994:8) This state of affairs stayed fairly constant till the beginning of the 19th century when upheaval and change in Europe started to have a profound effect on the region. Industrialisation on the European continent was progressing strongly putting the Spanish and Portuguese feudal systems at a great disadvantage that culminated in Napoleon invading both. This forced the colonies in Latin America to defend themselves and this fostered the beginnings of an independence movement, led by Simon Bolivar influenced by the example of the French and American revolutions (Ali 2008:149), in the region.(1994:8) Over the next century we gradually saw Spain and Portugal lose control over the region while local interests gained legitimacy and power. There was conflict over borders but the great distances and lack of military strength kept war to a minimum in all but two cases.(1994:9) While the presence of Britain, whose agenda was initially formulated to stop any coalition forming that would become involved in the Napoleonic Wars but one that would gradually evolve to matters of trade, prevented Spain retaking its lost holdings. By the beginning of the 20th century and following defeat by the US, in the Spanish-American War, the influence of Spain on the continent, as colonial master, had been eradicated from the region.

Yet while Latin America had broken from the yoke of colonisation early in the 19th century it remained essentially, in Lenin's words, a 'semi-colony' till WW II for a host of reasons. The fact was that Spain and Portugal may have been forced out but Western interests remained, draining the region of its resources while stunting internal development in favour of the export sector. (Hoogvelt: 2001:242) Nevertheless with the onset of the Great Depression and global war the region was forced to remodel its economy around import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies so as to replace the Western goods they had become dependent on.(2001:242) Concurrently we saw, as Sader (2008:4) notes, the first of three cycles of leftist strategies in this region.

In effect an alliance between the left and business elites came to pass, as Sader (2008:4) concludes, ''...in the name of economic modernization, agrarian reform and a certain autonomy with respect to northern imperialism.'' Dependency theory analysts have argued that the ISI model had in fact deepened the regions dependency on the West as it pushed domestic industries into producing goods aimed at the elites facilitating further dependence on foreign goods. (2001:244) As a consequence this model started to fail sending the business elites into an alliance with international capital, that laid the groundwork for future neo-liberal polices.(2008:4) Further to this, as Hoogvelt (2001:244) notes, the new middle and working classes, that had emerged in response to industrialisation and modernization, where seeing their calls for social justice ignored. In fact this movement caused the elites, co-opting the developing middle classes with them, to see authoritarian governments as the answer to the financial and social unrest that was fermenting as it would allow the stability required for economic growth.(2001:245) Despite this, or rather because of this, the Cuban revolution would usher in the second strategy of the left. (2008:4)

The Cuban revolution had a marked effect on the region. While the military juntas engaged in oppressive economic and social policies in the pursuit of economic growth the example of Cuba reinvigorated a demoralised left. Cuba's levels of development where similar to the rest of the region hence it provided an example of what could be achieved leading to an increase in rural and urban guerilla movements over the next 30 or so years.(2008:4) While there where some successes, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua being one example, by the end of the cold war we saw a ''... shift to a unipolar world under the imperial hegemony of the US which put an end to the viability of guerilla strategies'' (2008:4)

Meanwhile, as Phillips (2000:284) argues, by the early 90s the ''...inward looking...'' development model had been damaged beyond repair leading to the appropriation of the neo-liberal model across the majority of the region. One of the main tenements of this model was that to attain the necessary economic and political reforms the state sector would have to relinquish its role as regulator (2000:284) Nevertheless by the mid 90s we started to see this model fall apart. Hyperinflation across the region had been brought under control, but this had been done while economic growth stagnated, deficits increased, social inequalities increased and the region as a whole came under increased pressure from global financial speculation and as a result the governments that had been responsible for the neo libel reforms started to fall.(2008:2) As a direct response to neo-liberalism we have saw the left once again resurrected. This revitalisation of the left though is different to the movements we saw during the cold war and is, as Sader (2008:5) notes, the third cycle of leftist strategy.


This third strategy has, in Sader's (2008:5) words, ''...propelled social movements into the forefront of the resistance to neo-liberalism...'' These movements have for the first time come from below and rallied against the privatisation of the health, education and utility sectors. They have also stood up to Nafta and taken down three administrations in Ecuador. In effect what we have seen is popular movements within nations coming together in response to the crisis of the neo liberal model. A response Sader (2008:5) calls ''state versus civil society.'' Though as the movement has evolved we have seen representatives emerge, Morales in Peru, Chavez in Venezuela and Correa in Ecuador, that have moved into the political sphere creating a new alignment of left leaning states that is coming into the ascendancy while isolating the last vestiges of neo-liberalism in the region.

In contrast let us look at the development of East Asia. Before the 19th century East Asia was a highly civilized society based around, as Pempel notes, (2005:6) a sinocentric system that adhered to cultural exchange and tributary linking the region together as one. Nevertheless by the middle of the 19th century this would change as a whole host of Western nations consolidated their power through military conquest and split up East Asia, though Japan and Thailand managed to escape coming under the colonial yoke, and in the process we saw the erosion of the nexus that had existed. (2005:7) In addition, this multiplicity of powers in the region left it with a wide range of experiences, cultures, languages and religions of the not just the colonisers but the indigenous population too. East Asia's colonial experience had left the region very fragmented and the one attempt of integration during this period, by Japan (2005:7), had the effect of contributing to the fragmentation process in post WW II environment.

Moving on to the post-war period Pempel (2005:7) concludes that fragmentation was still a decisive factor, driven now by decolonisation and the cold war. With decolonisation we saw the newly sovereign states focus on domestic development while defending against the perceived threats of the old colonial masters, neighbours and regional or global hegemons which had the effect of halting any attempts to at bring the region together. While the cold war cleavage also kept this trend of fragmentation going. In effect we saw most nations either align with the USA or with the USSR, though there was a few nations, like Indonesia, that became part of the non-aligned movement further augmenting fragmentation.(2005:8) Concurrently, as Pempel (2005:8) notes, a situation that initially developed primarily on security issues would have far reaching effects on the economic sphere.

As the cold war heated up in the Asian theatre, with the onset of the Korean War and communist success in China, the US concluded that it should prevent its allies, primarily Japan, trading with the enemy, China. The fear within the US was that trading between the two nations would see Japan fall under the influence of communism.(2005:8) As a result the US designed a strategy that would act as a bulwark against communism (2001:224) by opening up its market to Japanese goods while encouraging its newly designed economic instruments, the World Bank and its ilk, to lend to it so that they could, as Pempel (2005:8) notes, become ''...the workshop of Asia.'' This strategy came to be known as export oriented industrialisation (EOI) and it would be rolled out to the other countries that came into the American ideological bloc.(2005:8) Nevertheless we still did not see much integration in the region as most nations embarked on a round on of, what neoclassical writers (2001:219) called, 'state capitalism' that saw policies enacted that manipulated the market towards their own national agendas while eschewing regional links for the bi-laterall arrangements they had with the US, but this would change in the 1970s.

There where a number of factors at work here according to Pempel.(2005:9&10) First the success of Japan started to shift its role in the region. It began to make amends for its war indiscretions by paying war reparations and establishing regional links with aid packages. Second, China started to emerge as a power in own right, opening its economy to the rest of the world and as a result we saw a cooling of the cold war tensions and finally, overcoming the early tensions of the post-colonial period ASEAN was formed. All of these events helped to ease tensions but a few obstacles still stood in the way, both relating to the US.

First due to the bi-lateral agreements that the US had with several states over security issues integration could not be achieved at this point. This situation changes by the early 90s and as Fawcett (Besson 2007:4) points out with the end of the cold war we saw the removal of the ideological divide that split the region and a ''...decentralisation of the international system...'' that has seen security and economic institutions take on a greater role at the regional level. Secondly, and relating to the economic sphere, most nations where tied into the US sphere through the EOI strategies but this started to change in the 80s when in response to the weakening of its own industries America evoked a raft of protectionist measures against Asian countries. (2005:9) This obviously weakened the ''pan-pacific ties'' (2005:10) but also forced the East Asian countries to reform their economies that left them open to the crash of 97 (2001:227) an event that has seen, according to Ravenhill (2002:2), the ASEAN+3 form. This facilitated collaboration on a scale not seen in the region before as the nations of East Asia reformed to meet the demands of the world.

In conclusion we can see that since colonial time these two regions have had vastly different experiences. For Latin America colonisation wiped out its cultural heritage but through a shared experience it fostered the creation of a pan-regional identity that has continued through today and has helped foster some of the most progressive social movements found anywhere in the world even when faced with highly oppressive regimes allied with global interests that have consistently put profit before civil society. While in East Asia its multipolar colonial experience destroyed the previous sinocentric order, leaving behind a whole host of diverse interests that at first proofed to be insurmountable to challenges of regionalism. Nevertheless since the end of WW II the shared experiences of this region have seen it come together in way that would have been impossible to imagine just a couple of decades ago and may possibly lead to the re-establishment of its long lost sinocentric order in the future.

Bibliography:

Ali, Tariq, Pirates of the Caribbean (London: Pluto, 2006).
Beeson, Mark, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security, and
Economic Development (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007)
Calvert, Peter A. R. The International Politics of Latin America. Manchester (New York: Manchester Univ.Pr, 1994)
Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing
Global Order, 2nd edn. (Oxford, OUP: 2000).
Hoogvelt, Ankie, Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political
Economy of Development , 2nd edn. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001)
Pempel, T.J. (ed.), Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 2005).
Phillips, Nicola, ‘The future of the political economy of Latin America’, in RichardStubbs and
Ravenhill, John, ‘A three bloc world? The new East Asian regionalism’, International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002)
Sader, Emir, ‘The weakest link? Neoliberalism in Latin America’, New Left Review,
no 52 (July-August 2008).

Was there a distinct style of Jacksonian politics?



The question of whether there was a distinct style of politics in the Jacksonian era of American history, 1820 – 40, is an important one as it is considered that ''Before Jackson, it was possible to think of America without putting the people at the centre of politics; after him, such a thing was inconceivable.'' (Meacham:2008) The distinct style of politics that facilitated this change emerged due to the evolution of party politics and the factionalism that was tearing apart the Republican Party. After 1824 factions broke away from the Republicans to form the Democrat party led by Andrew Jackson. This new faction led to an embryonic form of the two-party system, a transformation in party organisation and an embracing of a new style of political campaigning that disseminated the populist message of Jackson to a electorate that had been radically transformed by the market revolution. This in turn led to Jackson’s political opponents coalescing into the Whig party and in an attempt to recapture the presidency they too embarked on reforms that enabled them to win the 1840 election by embracing the style that had been so successful for the Democrats.

With the decline of the Federalist Party after the War of 1812 we saw national politics evolve in to a one party system. Out of this a consensus emerged that looked to rehabilitate the federalists back into government, what one New England editor at the time coined ''An era of good feelings.'' Though paradoxically what we saw was a growth of factions over the years rather than the harmony James Monroe originally sought (Watson 2006:59). Ultimately this situation led to the various factions within the party producing five candidates for the presidency in 1824 and the subsequent result stands out as it set in motion a chain of events that would be crucial to the development of the two party system. (Ashworth 1995:370)

With the ascendancy of John Quincy Adams to the presidency we immediately saw the splits in the party come to the fore. Jackson had won both the popular and electoral vote but with no overall majority (Pessen 1985:163) the appointment of the president was left to the congress to decide. In congress Henry Clay, frustrated by his low polling figures in the election, still had enough power to as Remini (1997:14) states, play 'king-maker', putting Adams into the presidency while being subsequently offered the office of sectary of state. Allies of Jackson interpreted this deal as a ''corrupt bargain'' and Jackson himself proclaimed that ''The will of the people has been thwarted.'' (1997:14 & 2006:82 )

There where others in Washington who agreed with and shared Jackson's political convictions, most notably Martin Van Buren. Both shared a believe in Jeffersonian Republicanism with Van Buren further believing that the protracted one party system now in operation would lead to corruption and misbehaviour the result of which would be the hobbling of good government. (1997:13) So when, in his first state of the union address, Adams announced the details of a massive spending program called the 'American system' (1997:15) this clique became aghast at the direction the country was taking. As a direct result of this Van Buren reached out to Vice President John C. Calhoun. (1997:16) In a crucial meeting the former impressed on the latter that Jackson was the logical choice to unite behind, due to his popularity with the electorate, in opposition to Adams. (1997:17) Calhoun also shared Jackson and Van Buren's fear of the threat to republicanism and in June of 1826 pledged his support to Jackson for the 1828 election (2006:73) an alliance that was the beginning of the Democrat party.

To get Jackson the presidency in 1828 Van Buren would have to mobilise an electorate that was changing radically due to the processes of the market revolution and an increase in suffrage around the country. These changes in American society where having a profound effect, producing a collective sense of fear for the future of the republic. Americans where losing their faith in the liberty and equality promised by the young country.(Feller 1995:XII) But according to Watson (2006:48) Americans still felt that republicanism could offer them dignity and this did not escape the attention of Van Buren and Jackson.( Rozwenc 1964:XIX) Van Buren knew that Jackson’s achievements combined with his populist majoritarian rhetoric made him the perfect receptacle for the votes of the people but he also recognized that strong party organisation was required and as Watson (2006:87) observes he henceforth set about using the skills and knowledge he gained in New York, where new techniques of mobilizing the electorate had sprung up. (1964:XVII)

To achieve the strong party organisation that Van Buren desired he would go about creating a national structure by adopting the spoils system that he had been in use while he was a Bucktail in New York.(2006:70) This allowed Jackson to distribute patronage and achieve loyalty to the party. (1964:XVII) They also took advantage of new technologies and disseminated their propaganda through a national newspaper based in Washington that would in time expand to encompass many other papers around the country. Their was an embracing of new methods and a reworking of older forms to get across their message such as adopting the symbol of the hickory leaf, they would hold ''Jackson meetings'' in counties that had a Democratic party presence attracting the ire of political opponents who complained that these meeting where comprised of ''..the dissolute, the noisy, the discontented, and designing of society.'' The Democrats replied that these where the real people of America of whom Jackson was one and whose interests he represented.(1997:18-20) They also would hold parades, barbecues, rallies in the hope that they would attract an enthusiastic attentive audience (1985:160) and finally and crucially Van Buren took advantage of the convention.

The convention was crucial as Van Buren recognised the reward that the party could obtain by turning the nomination process over to the voter. In effect it appeared as though the party was decentralizing the appointment process and giving the people an important role in the selection of nominees who would have to vie for the support of the party faithful to gain the nomination. It was also a process that required strong oratory skills, of which Jackson's populist style was suited to. In reality though a study conducted by Richard McCormick during this era showed that they where little more than a cosmetic process that gave the impression of participation but was open to manipulation and control by party leaders and as James Stanton Chase noted ''delegates were only asked to approve a choice made by an inner circle of party leaders.'' (1985:159) Despite the criticism, this new style of campaigning and organising had achieved its goal and the Democrat party held the presidency till 1840.

In response to this the opposition, who had been in disarray for several years, started to coalesces into a faction, the Whigs, that aligned not on what they agreed on but what they opposed, Jackson and his policies.(1995:380) The policies of the Democrats from 1828 onwards had created an environment that solidified the two party system and what we now saw was essentially an alliance of slaveholders and farmers versus those who believed in and where allied with merchant capital.(1995:X) While within the electorate itself, the populist façade of the Democratic party was faltering as government policies over issues such as nullification and the bank crisis revealed where the Democrats agenda lay. This provided an opportunity for the Whigs to expand their base and pick up votes from dismayed Democratic supporters. They did this as the Pessen (1985:169) notes by using the same techniques that the Democrats used in previous elections. They campaigned using populist rhetoric, their candidate in 1840 was, like Jackson, a war hero and on reflection the Democratic Review commenting on the Whigs success concluded ''we have taught them to conquer us!''

In conclusion what we saw in the Jacksonian era was indeed a distinct style of politics. The factionalism that we saw emerge in Washington in the early 1820s led to a radical change in the nature of political campaigns. The reforms we saw here recognised the changing political and social landscape of America, embraced populist majoritarian politics, though a very limited form, then disseminated it through newspapers, rallies, conventions and with the acceptance of these new techniques by opposing political factions we see the formation of a two party system. The legacy of the Jacksonian era and the style of politics that characterised it still reverberate through American society today and we see many parallels to it in modern campaigns where populist politicians try to connect to the electorate through the same ideas of majoritarian politics, using a two party system that has its roots here and in the case of the Obama's 2008 campaign an openness to use new technology to get their message across to the electorate.



Bibliography:
• Ashworth, John. 1995. Slavery, capitalism, and politics in the Antebellum Republic 1 Commerce and compromise, 1820 - 1850. Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press.
• Feller, Daniel. 1995. The Jacksonian promise: America, 1815-1840. The American moment. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Meacham, Jon “The Change Agent. Our politics are rooted in the grand, complicated presidency of Andrew Jackson.” New York. http://www.newsweek.com/id/166828/output/print (accessed March 4, 2009).
• Pessen, Edward. 1985. Jacksonian America: society, personality, and politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
• Remini, Robert Vincent. 1997. The Jacksonian era. Wheeling, Ill: Harlan Davidson.
• Rozwenc, Edwin C. 1964. Ideology and power in the age of Jackson. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books.
• Watson, Harry L. 2006. Liberty and power: the politics of Jacksonian America. New York: Hill and Wang.