How and why did the Chinese and Japanese responses to the West differ during the nineteenth century?



The key issue here, how and why the responses differed, is important because it enables us to understand how the continuing process of industrialisation is effected by both internal and external pressures. This matters because the processes of
industrialisation is still ongoing and having a better understanding of the past will lead us into making better decisions in the future. So to answer this question we shall look at the different responses to the West's encroachment into these nations, first the Chinese and then the Japanese, while analysing the social, cultural and political factors that had such a profound effect on the outcomes.

China's initial encounters with the west came as early as 1514, but by this time it was a self sufficient centralized state (Fairbank 1979:151) due to its regional dominance and trade ties created through the Tribute system (1979:160). The legacy of this cultural and regional domination led the Chinese to believe that 'China was the unique land of civilization' (Craig & Reischauer 1978:122). There was nothing that they could learn from the Western barbarians (1978:122). In fact they felt Westerners where no better than the Mongols and they had dealt with them by building the Great Wall of China. With this kind of attitude trade early on with the west was restricted to Canton (1979:162). The Canton System, as it was called, was problematic, but still benefits where enjoyed by all (1979:162). Unfortunately the status quo would not remain. Chinese domestic problems where just starting to emerge and these would have serious repercussions

The main problem in China during this period was the stagnation of the Manchu Dynasty. The subsequent decline of this centralized bureaucracy meant it was unable to respond to a population explosion that saw a two-fold increase from 200 to 400 million between the early and mid 19th century (1979:173). The roots of this phenomena originate in the internal peace brought about by the Manchu dynasty. They took advantage of an increase in foreign trade, improvements in transport and most crucially continued growth in food production to facilitate the necessary factors needed to see a sustained population increase (1979:173). But from this point onwards the Manchu's centralized bureaucracy started to become the problem. Its disconnect from the reality outside Peking meant policy was slow to respond, with one particular problem being that of the tax code (1979:174). The Manchu's inaction in regards to the tax code and the changing demographics had a drastic effect on the public purse. The reduction in government revenue and expenditure expedited the decline of institutions they had been created to maintain social order and stability. Of the many social problems this created the one that is of importance here is the surge in opium addiction.

Opium had a detrimental effect for several reasons. First for the Chinese the illicit trade in opium was not just aggravating current social problems but it was draining the countries capital reserves which led to an exasperation of wider economic problems (Harrison 1967:16). Secondly China's solution, suppression of the trade antagonised relations with western traders and this led to the collapse of the Canton system. By interfering with the trade of the narcotic the Chinese where hurting the British Empire at its weakest point, its capital surplus, and endangering its imperial mission of civilization. The actions taken by Commissioner Lin Tse-Hu, in 1840, to control the trade directly resulted in the two Opium Wars, with the subsequent result being that China capitulated to Western desires and interests in the region.

The Opium wars where an unmitigated disaster for the Chinese. For one thing it it could have been avoided but the decline of the Manchu dynasty had led to a situation where Peking was not receiving the information it required and so formulated policy based on the falsities it received from officials more interested in preserving the status quo (1967:30). In effect as Harrison (1967:31) notes this 'represented the growing degeneration of the financial health of the government and the people.' As a result of these factors the West forced the unequal treaties on china (1967:20). These treaties brought about a legal structure that had evolved by 1858 to a point where the West gained an upper hand against china in its demands for trade on its terms (1979:165).

These demands in general where not favourable to the Chinese but the most destructive was the 'most favoured nation clause.' This clause meant that all foreign powers shared the privileges that they leveraged out of the Chinese (1079:169). This diversion of income further compounded the situation for the Manchu Dynasty as now they had even less capital to halt the decay in the institutions tasked with preventing the social unrest that could lead to a fermenting and mobilising of Chinese society into revolutionary movements (1967:29). The first of which to appear in this period was the Taiping Rebellion.

The Taiping rebellion gained ground because it appealed to the poor and desperate in Chinese society by supporting the ancient right of peasant ownership through their agrarian reforms of 1853(1967:38). Unfortunately its nationalistic rhetoric put it at odds with the west (1967:39) and this was fundamental to its success, or lack of it, as the Imperial powers decided to prop up the Manchu Dynasty. The rebellion though did produce one development that is relevant here. To deal with the unrest Peking had given the provinces more power with the result that once this decentralisation was complete authority had shifted away from the centre to the provinces and the Manchus where never to regain it (1967:43).



This de-centralization led to the final disintegration of the old system but the problems that derived from the last century of decline where too powerful to overcome in the short term. It was not till 1901, after the third of the great shocks, with the restructuring of the Chinese state by the West that industrialization started to begin in earnest. Unfortunately by this time just across the seas the Japanese had emerged from their round of industrialisation to up surd the old order and become the new regional hegemon.

With the arrival of Western powers in Japan the reaction they received was rather similar to the Chinese one, initial isolation but increasing pressure from Western traders resulting in the signing of unequal treaties by the home nation.(1978:120). But unlike the the Chinese, Japanese society contained several factors that meant this position would not have such a prevalent influence. The first was the Japanese attitude to the outside world (1978:122). Where as the Chinese saw themselves as a superior civilization the Japanese, as Reischauer & Craig (1978:122) suggest, where distinct enough to have developed their own identity. One that, while weary of China, recognised a plurality of civilised nations due to the fact that they had learned from other nations. Entertaining the idea that they could learn from the West was not hard for the Japanese to embrace. Secondly as opposed to China's centralized bureaucracy Japanese society was still based on a feudal system unified under a shogun that was fast losing power to the 260 domains scattered throughout the country. This multitude of political systems resulted in a variety of responses to Western encroachment (1978:123) and unlike in China, the central authority here was unable to suppress the agents of change present in Japanese society.

These agents of change took the form of two domains, Satsuma and Choshu. As mentioned in the last paragraph the initial reaction to the West was expulsion and these two where no different. One example of this policy was the Choshu actions, while in the ascendancy in the spring of 1683, forcing the shogun into setting a date for the Westerners to be expelled. (1978:128) The subsequent display of military strength, meant to cast the barbarians out, resulted in military defeat, but it did reveal two factors: the lack of authority that the shogun held and the ineffectiveness of the Japanese defences against the superior military technology of the West (1978: 128-9)

Military defeat of the Choshu by the West, while humiliating, lead them to recognise the futility of their foreign policy but also and more importantly they realised the need to modernize their own military force and techniques (1978: 129) In the same period the Satsuma leaders also realised the same fact (1978:130) and possessing the necessary capital both regions embarked on a process of trade with the West (1978:127) that imported the technology and techniques required to eventually defeat the shogun and bring an end to the Tokugawa system. (1978:131)

With the end of the Tokugawa system Satsuma and Choshu as the two power houses in Japan led what Reischauer & Craig (1978: 134) called in 1868 an ''imperial restoration.'' This resulted in the creation of a new government headed by the Meiji Emperor. For now though it was largely a symbolic institution with power remaining with the samurai who led the revolution (1978:134), who still had a lot of work to do to meat the demands of industrialisation.

Two factors helped the new government go instigate change. To begin with the new administration was free from the attachments of tradition enabling them to institute drastic innovation. More importantly though the past 15 years of interaction with the West had brought many within Japan to realise that they required realistic policies that would help them retain their independence in the face of a foreign threat that was here for good (1978:135).

The new policies that where formulated recognised the need to match western military and economic power, and that to go about it would require a centralisation of authority so that reforms could be enacted (1978:135). The issuing of the ''Five Articles of Oath'' reaffirmed this believe and the direction of the new government (1978:135). The articles called for a establishment of assemblies for public debate, the removal of the old feudal restrictions and finally a call of adherence to the just laws of nature (1978:135).

What this last article meant in reality was that knowledge from around the world would be instrumental in establishing and strengthening the new Japan (1978:136). In effect the new order had moved from its original position of expulsion to that of, as Reischauer & Craig (1978:136) suggest, reinventing the ancient Chinese idea of 'fukoku kyobei' (a rich country and strong military) through western technology. These changes where successful for two reasons; firstly because the factions in charge of government, Choshu and Satsuma, where the strongest domains and they where able to co-opt the rest for fear of being left out of the new state being built (1978:137). Secondly unlike China where the Emperor was seen as part of the old elite system the Japanese emperor was not and this made it a lot easier for power to be handed back to a strong central authority. With a determined administration in place, that now had the requisite authority, the Meiji Restoration set about solving the domestic and foreign policy dilemma that where holding the country back (1978:144). Japan was so successful at this transition that by 1905 they had revised the unequal treaties, invaded China, formed an alliance with Britain and defeated the Russian navy.

In conclusion the evidence presented shows that while both nations where initially inclined to observe isolationist policies when it came to the West, Japanese culture allowed it to recognise the futility of this stance while the Chinese sense of its own superiority blinded it to the strength of Western imperialism. This arrogance along with the centralized bureaucracy of the Manchu Dynasty led to a stagnation of policy meaning that the Chinese administrators could not react to the changes industrialisation was bringing to the country. Meanwhile the feudal system still operating in Japan allowed a fluidity of political alternatives to exist that facilitated a more positive response to Western encroachment. This acceptance of Western technologies and ideas led Japan to not only industrialize faster than China but to become a power that rivalled any nation in the west. Though as we can see from events occurring in the world today it could be argued that China, since the mid 1990's, has re-emerged not just as a regional hegemon but in this time of global economic crisis possibly the one nation that could up surd America as the new global superpower.

Bibliography:
Craig, A. & Reischauer, E., 1978. Japan tradition and transformation. Cambridge (MA): Houghton Mifflin School
Fairbank, J.K., 1979. The United States and China. 4th ed. London: Harvard University Press
Harrison, J. 1967. China since 1800. New York: Brace & World