A few weeks ago I mentioned the Shared Partnership for Prosperity (SPP) in a post. The main point was that it was in effect an instrument of security integration between the United States and Mexico. A serious issue for Mexican sovereignty. Anyway that went by the wayside in 2009 to be exhumed a few months ago in the form of the ''High Level Regulatory Cooperation Council (HLRCC),''. Dana Gabriel's piece suggests that this institutional framework contains the same regulatory approach to security that the SPP had.

So it appears that the US's wider strategy of the entire region is still on track. While some talk of how the State department has no real policy for the whole region, while Clinton sidelinedArturo Valenzuela for two of the regions Ambassadors, Brazil & Mexico, this only continues to reaffirm the comment made Ambassador Brownfield as a congressional hearing earlier this year that US policy was focusing on reacting to the balloon effect by expanding its interdiction efforts to the whole region comprising, Central America, the Caribbean and the Andes.

The BBC's Newsnight does a hack job

Newsnight of October the 28, a BBC current affairs program, aired a prime example of why mainstream media is letting the British public down in fair and accurate reporting in discussing the conflicts our nation is involved in. The opening 20 minutes made absolutely no attempt to create a dialectic picture of what actually happened the day that an American Apache helicopter engaged a group of Iraqis due to the pilots mistakenly identifying a Reuters employees camera as an RPG.




The incident in question first came to light when internet site Wikileaks released the video from the helicopter earlier in the year. First we where presented with a puff piece about how brave US servicemen are in face of all the violence and horror. This was followed by an interview with Dr Kilcullen, a academic who advises the US military, that began with a discussion about the motives that may have led to two young children being in the fire zone. Dr Kilcullen at first refuses to speculate on this then does so less than five seconds later, well spotted Kirsty oh hang on she introduced the topic. So at least 3 or 4 mentions of a RPG that may or may not have belonged to one of the murdered Iraqis but the Reuters cameraman carrying a camera that was mistaken for a weapon leading to the commencement of the incident is only referred to once and is never expanded on.

Then accusations about Wikileaks being political are levelled, is this a bad thing when there are recorded cases of complicity by military personal in torture. Was the creation of the Geneva conventions not political, accords are military machines are supposed to be upholding.

Then we had unsubstantiated drivel worthy of the ''unnamed government officials'' that so often appear in the NY Times about what might happen to Afghans at the hands of the Taliban due to Wikileaks revelations. Yet in the last week or so the Pentagon on CNN said that no such incidents have occurred. Well done BBC standards dropping below that of CNN and matching the mouthpiece of the US foreign policy establishment.

I guess along with the UK intelligence services and British Aerospace who are both extensions of their respective American counterparts the BBC appears to has given up any pretence of impartiality to become an extension of theirs. I suppose if someone at the BBC is trying to keep the new Tory government happy, job well done.

Previously the amount of jingoism on Newsnight has generally not been as bad as the other UK television news programs. But tonight the lack of freedom that Newsnight enjoys when it comes to reporting the foreign adventures of the UK has been revealed.

At this rate maybe we will soon see Glen Beck taking over from Jeremy Paxman, I hear he's got a good line in Hitler comparisons.

Latin America and East Asia:
A comparison of their Politcal Economies

In this essay we shall be comparing and contrasting the regions of Latin America, the nations of North and South America where the romance languages are spoken south of the USA, and East Asia, defined here as the Asean + 3. In comparing and contrasting these two regions we will identify the main features of their respective political economies. By examining each region separately we shall look at the historical development of both regions, starting with their first contact with the European powers through the cold war up to the contemporary setting. In the case of Latin America this shall focus on the battle between the forces of first colonialism then neo-liberalism versus various social movements, from Bolivar to Chavez, that have emerged over the last two centuries. While in the case of East Asia we shall begin with the colonial experience and the ensuing fragmentation of its the sinocentric system, continuing through the cold war to the contemporary environment where new shared experiences have fostered a new regional agenda.
Latin America, a highly civilized region at the time, first came into contact with the European powers in the late15th century with the discovery by Columbus, for the Spanish crown, of the West Indies. Within a short time most of Latin America was under the control of the Spanish, with Portugal taking Brazil. (Calvert 1994:8) This state of affairs stayed fairly constant till the beginning of the 19th century when upheaval and change in Europe started to have a profound effect on the region. Industrialisation on the European continent was progressing strongly putting the Spanish and Portuguese feudal systems at a great disadvantage that culminated in Napoleon invading both. This forced the colonies in Latin America to defend themselves and this fostered the beginnings of an independence movement, led by Simon Bolivar influenced by the example of the French and American revolutions (Ali 2008:149), in the region.(1994:8) Over the next century we gradually saw Spain and Portugal lose control over the region while local interests gained legitimacy and power. There was conflict over borders but the great distances and lack of military strength kept war to a minimum in all but two cases.(1994:9) While the presence of Britain, whose agenda was initially formulated to stop any coalition forming that would become involved in the Napoleonic Wars but one that would gradually evolve to matters of trade, prevented Spain retaking its lost holdings. By the beginning of the 20th century and following defeat by the US, in the Spanish-American War, the influence of Spain on the continent, as colonial master, had been eradicated from the region.

Yet while Latin America had broken from the yoke of colonisation early in the 19th century it remained essentially, in Lenin's words, a 'semi-colony' till WW II for a host of reasons. The fact was that Spain and Portugal may have been forced out but Western interests remained, draining the region of its resources while stunting internal development in favour of the export sector. (Hoogvelt: 2001:242) Nevertheless with the onset of the Great Depression and global war the region was forced to remodel its economy around import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies so as to replace the Western goods they had become dependent on.(2001:242) Concurrently we saw, as Sader (2008:4) notes, the first of three cycles of leftist strategies in this region.

In effect an alliance between the left and business elites came to pass, as Sader (2008:4) concludes, ''...in the name of economic modernization, agrarian reform and a certain autonomy with respect to northern imperialism.'' Dependency theory analysts have argued that the ISI model had in fact deepened the regions dependency on the West as it pushed domestic industries into producing goods aimed at the elites facilitating further dependence on foreign goods. (2001:244) As a consequence this model started to fail sending the business elites into an alliance with international capital, that laid the groundwork for future neo-liberal polices.(2008:4) Further to this, as Hoogvelt (2001:244) notes, the new middle and working classes, that had emerged in response to industrialisation and modernization, where seeing their calls for social justice ignored. In fact this movement caused the elites, co-opting the developing middle classes with them, to see authoritarian governments as the answer to the financial and social unrest that was fermenting as it would allow the stability required for economic growth.(2001:245) Despite this, or rather because of this, the Cuban revolution would usher in the second strategy of the left. (2008:4)

The Cuban revolution had a marked effect on the region. While the military juntas engaged in oppressive economic and social policies in the pursuit of economic growth the example of Cuba reinvigorated a demoralised left. Cuba's levels of development where similar to the rest of the region hence it provided an example of what could be achieved leading to an increase in rural and urban guerilla movements over the next 30 or so years.(2008:4) While there where some successes, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua being one example, by the end of the cold war we saw a ''... shift to a unipolar world under the imperial hegemony of the US which put an end to the viability of guerilla strategies'' (2008:4)

Meanwhile, as Phillips (2000:284) argues, by the early 90s the ''...inward looking...'' development model had been damaged beyond repair leading to the appropriation of the neo-liberal model across the majority of the region. One of the main tenements of this model was that to attain the necessary economic and political reforms the state sector would have to relinquish its role as regulator (2000:284) Nevertheless by the mid 90s we started to see this model fall apart. Hyperinflation across the region had been brought under control, but this had been done while economic growth stagnated, deficits increased, social inequalities increased and the region as a whole came under increased pressure from global financial speculation and as a result the governments that had been responsible for the neo libel reforms started to fall.(2008:2) As a direct response to neo-liberalism we have saw the left once again resurrected. This revitalisation of the left though is different to the movements we saw during the cold war and is, as Sader (2008:5) notes, the third cycle of leftist strategy.


This third strategy has, in Sader's (2008:5) words, ''...propelled social movements into the forefront of the resistance to neo-liberalism...'' These movements have for the first time come from below and rallied against the privatisation of the health, education and utility sectors. They have also stood up to Nafta and taken down three administrations in Ecuador. In effect what we have seen is popular movements within nations coming together in response to the crisis of the neo liberal model. A response Sader (2008:5) calls ''state versus civil society.'' Though as the movement has evolved we have seen representatives emerge, Morales in Peru, Chavez in Venezuela and Correa in Ecuador, that have moved into the political sphere creating a new alignment of left leaning states that is coming into the ascendancy while isolating the last vestiges of neo-liberalism in the region.

In contrast let us look at the development of East Asia. Before the 19th century East Asia was a highly civilized society based around, as Pempel notes, (2005:6) a sinocentric system that adhered to cultural exchange and tributary linking the region together as one. Nevertheless by the middle of the 19th century this would change as a whole host of Western nations consolidated their power through military conquest and split up East Asia, though Japan and Thailand managed to escape coming under the colonial yoke, and in the process we saw the erosion of the nexus that had existed. (2005:7) In addition, this multiplicity of powers in the region left it with a wide range of experiences, cultures, languages and religions of the not just the colonisers but the indigenous population too. East Asia's colonial experience had left the region very fragmented and the one attempt of integration during this period, by Japan (2005:7), had the effect of contributing to the fragmentation process in post WW II environment.

Moving on to the post-war period Pempel (2005:7) concludes that fragmentation was still a decisive factor, driven now by decolonisation and the cold war. With decolonisation we saw the newly sovereign states focus on domestic development while defending against the perceived threats of the old colonial masters, neighbours and regional or global hegemons which had the effect of halting any attempts to at bring the region together. While the cold war cleavage also kept this trend of fragmentation going. In effect we saw most nations either align with the USA or with the USSR, though there was a few nations, like Indonesia, that became part of the non-aligned movement further augmenting fragmentation.(2005:8) Concurrently, as Pempel (2005:8) notes, a situation that initially developed primarily on security issues would have far reaching effects on the economic sphere.

As the cold war heated up in the Asian theatre, with the onset of the Korean War and communist success in China, the US concluded that it should prevent its allies, primarily Japan, trading with the enemy, China. The fear within the US was that trading between the two nations would see Japan fall under the influence of communism.(2005:8) As a result the US designed a strategy that would act as a bulwark against communism (2001:224) by opening up its market to Japanese goods while encouraging its newly designed economic instruments, the World Bank and its ilk, to lend to it so that they could, as Pempel (2005:8) notes, become ''...the workshop of Asia.'' This strategy came to be known as export oriented industrialisation (EOI) and it would be rolled out to the other countries that came into the American ideological bloc.(2005:8) Nevertheless we still did not see much integration in the region as most nations embarked on a round on of, what neoclassical writers (2001:219) called, 'state capitalism' that saw policies enacted that manipulated the market towards their own national agendas while eschewing regional links for the bi-laterall arrangements they had with the US, but this would change in the 1970s.

There where a number of factors at work here according to Pempel.(2005:9&10) First the success of Japan started to shift its role in the region. It began to make amends for its war indiscretions by paying war reparations and establishing regional links with aid packages. Second, China started to emerge as a power in own right, opening its economy to the rest of the world and as a result we saw a cooling of the cold war tensions and finally, overcoming the early tensions of the post-colonial period ASEAN was formed. All of these events helped to ease tensions but a few obstacles still stood in the way, both relating to the US.

First due to the bi-lateral agreements that the US had with several states over security issues integration could not be achieved at this point. This situation changes by the early 90s and as Fawcett (Besson 2007:4) points out with the end of the cold war we saw the removal of the ideological divide that split the region and a ''...decentralisation of the international system...'' that has seen security and economic institutions take on a greater role at the regional level. Secondly, and relating to the economic sphere, most nations where tied into the US sphere through the EOI strategies but this started to change in the 80s when in response to the weakening of its own industries America evoked a raft of protectionist measures against Asian countries. (2005:9) This obviously weakened the ''pan-pacific ties'' (2005:10) but also forced the East Asian countries to reform their economies that left them open to the crash of 97 (2001:227) an event that has seen, according to Ravenhill (2002:2), the ASEAN+3 form. This facilitated collaboration on a scale not seen in the region before as the nations of East Asia reformed to meet the demands of the world.

In conclusion we can see that since colonial time these two regions have had vastly different experiences. For Latin America colonisation wiped out its cultural heritage but through a shared experience it fostered the creation of a pan-regional identity that has continued through today and has helped foster some of the most progressive social movements found anywhere in the world even when faced with highly oppressive regimes allied with global interests that have consistently put profit before civil society. While in East Asia its multipolar colonial experience destroyed the previous sinocentric order, leaving behind a whole host of diverse interests that at first proofed to be insurmountable to challenges of regionalism. Nevertheless since the end of WW II the shared experiences of this region have seen it come together in way that would have been impossible to imagine just a couple of decades ago and may possibly lead to the re-establishment of its long lost sinocentric order in the future.

Bibliography:

Ali, Tariq, Pirates of the Caribbean (London: Pluto, 2006).
Beeson, Mark, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security, and
Economic Development (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007)
Calvert, Peter A. R. The International Politics of Latin America. Manchester (New York: Manchester Univ.Pr, 1994)
Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing
Global Order, 2nd edn. (Oxford, OUP: 2000).
Hoogvelt, Ankie, Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political
Economy of Development , 2nd edn. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001)
Pempel, T.J. (ed.), Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 2005).
Phillips, Nicola, ‘The future of the political economy of Latin America’, in RichardStubbs and
Ravenhill, John, ‘A three bloc world? The new East Asian regionalism’, International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002)
Sader, Emir, ‘The weakest link? Neoliberalism in Latin America’, New Left Review,
no 52 (July-August 2008).

Was there a distinct style of Jacksonian politics?



The question of whether there was a distinct style of politics in the Jacksonian era of American history, 1820 – 40, is an important one as it is considered that ''Before Jackson, it was possible to think of America without putting the people at the centre of politics; after him, such a thing was inconceivable.'' (Meacham:2008) The distinct style of politics that facilitated this change emerged due to the evolution of party politics and the factionalism that was tearing apart the Republican Party. After 1824 factions broke away from the Republicans to form the Democrat party led by Andrew Jackson. This new faction led to an embryonic form of the two-party system, a transformation in party organisation and an embracing of a new style of political campaigning that disseminated the populist message of Jackson to a electorate that had been radically transformed by the market revolution. This in turn led to Jackson’s political opponents coalescing into the Whig party and in an attempt to recapture the presidency they too embarked on reforms that enabled them to win the 1840 election by embracing the style that had been so successful for the Democrats.

With the decline of the Federalist Party after the War of 1812 we saw national politics evolve in to a one party system. Out of this a consensus emerged that looked to rehabilitate the federalists back into government, what one New England editor at the time coined ''An era of good feelings.'' Though paradoxically what we saw was a growth of factions over the years rather than the harmony James Monroe originally sought (Watson 2006:59). Ultimately this situation led to the various factions within the party producing five candidates for the presidency in 1824 and the subsequent result stands out as it set in motion a chain of events that would be crucial to the development of the two party system. (Ashworth 1995:370)

With the ascendancy of John Quincy Adams to the presidency we immediately saw the splits in the party come to the fore. Jackson had won both the popular and electoral vote but with no overall majority (Pessen 1985:163) the appointment of the president was left to the congress to decide. In congress Henry Clay, frustrated by his low polling figures in the election, still had enough power to as Remini (1997:14) states, play 'king-maker', putting Adams into the presidency while being subsequently offered the office of sectary of state. Allies of Jackson interpreted this deal as a ''corrupt bargain'' and Jackson himself proclaimed that ''The will of the people has been thwarted.'' (1997:14 & 2006:82 )

There where others in Washington who agreed with and shared Jackson's political convictions, most notably Martin Van Buren. Both shared a believe in Jeffersonian Republicanism with Van Buren further believing that the protracted one party system now in operation would lead to corruption and misbehaviour the result of which would be the hobbling of good government. (1997:13) So when, in his first state of the union address, Adams announced the details of a massive spending program called the 'American system' (1997:15) this clique became aghast at the direction the country was taking. As a direct result of this Van Buren reached out to Vice President John C. Calhoun. (1997:16) In a crucial meeting the former impressed on the latter that Jackson was the logical choice to unite behind, due to his popularity with the electorate, in opposition to Adams. (1997:17) Calhoun also shared Jackson and Van Buren's fear of the threat to republicanism and in June of 1826 pledged his support to Jackson for the 1828 election (2006:73) an alliance that was the beginning of the Democrat party.

To get Jackson the presidency in 1828 Van Buren would have to mobilise an electorate that was changing radically due to the processes of the market revolution and an increase in suffrage around the country. These changes in American society where having a profound effect, producing a collective sense of fear for the future of the republic. Americans where losing their faith in the liberty and equality promised by the young country.(Feller 1995:XII) But according to Watson (2006:48) Americans still felt that republicanism could offer them dignity and this did not escape the attention of Van Buren and Jackson.( Rozwenc 1964:XIX) Van Buren knew that Jackson’s achievements combined with his populist majoritarian rhetoric made him the perfect receptacle for the votes of the people but he also recognized that strong party organisation was required and as Watson (2006:87) observes he henceforth set about using the skills and knowledge he gained in New York, where new techniques of mobilizing the electorate had sprung up. (1964:XVII)

To achieve the strong party organisation that Van Buren desired he would go about creating a national structure by adopting the spoils system that he had been in use while he was a Bucktail in New York.(2006:70) This allowed Jackson to distribute patronage and achieve loyalty to the party. (1964:XVII) They also took advantage of new technologies and disseminated their propaganda through a national newspaper based in Washington that would in time expand to encompass many other papers around the country. Their was an embracing of new methods and a reworking of older forms to get across their message such as adopting the symbol of the hickory leaf, they would hold ''Jackson meetings'' in counties that had a Democratic party presence attracting the ire of political opponents who complained that these meeting where comprised of ''..the dissolute, the noisy, the discontented, and designing of society.'' The Democrats replied that these where the real people of America of whom Jackson was one and whose interests he represented.(1997:18-20) They also would hold parades, barbecues, rallies in the hope that they would attract an enthusiastic attentive audience (1985:160) and finally and crucially Van Buren took advantage of the convention.

The convention was crucial as Van Buren recognised the reward that the party could obtain by turning the nomination process over to the voter. In effect it appeared as though the party was decentralizing the appointment process and giving the people an important role in the selection of nominees who would have to vie for the support of the party faithful to gain the nomination. It was also a process that required strong oratory skills, of which Jackson's populist style was suited to. In reality though a study conducted by Richard McCormick during this era showed that they where little more than a cosmetic process that gave the impression of participation but was open to manipulation and control by party leaders and as James Stanton Chase noted ''delegates were only asked to approve a choice made by an inner circle of party leaders.'' (1985:159) Despite the criticism, this new style of campaigning and organising had achieved its goal and the Democrat party held the presidency till 1840.

In response to this the opposition, who had been in disarray for several years, started to coalesces into a faction, the Whigs, that aligned not on what they agreed on but what they opposed, Jackson and his policies.(1995:380) The policies of the Democrats from 1828 onwards had created an environment that solidified the two party system and what we now saw was essentially an alliance of slaveholders and farmers versus those who believed in and where allied with merchant capital.(1995:X) While within the electorate itself, the populist façade of the Democratic party was faltering as government policies over issues such as nullification and the bank crisis revealed where the Democrats agenda lay. This provided an opportunity for the Whigs to expand their base and pick up votes from dismayed Democratic supporters. They did this as the Pessen (1985:169) notes by using the same techniques that the Democrats used in previous elections. They campaigned using populist rhetoric, their candidate in 1840 was, like Jackson, a war hero and on reflection the Democratic Review commenting on the Whigs success concluded ''we have taught them to conquer us!''

In conclusion what we saw in the Jacksonian era was indeed a distinct style of politics. The factionalism that we saw emerge in Washington in the early 1820s led to a radical change in the nature of political campaigns. The reforms we saw here recognised the changing political and social landscape of America, embraced populist majoritarian politics, though a very limited form, then disseminated it through newspapers, rallies, conventions and with the acceptance of these new techniques by opposing political factions we see the formation of a two party system. The legacy of the Jacksonian era and the style of politics that characterised it still reverberate through American society today and we see many parallels to it in modern campaigns where populist politicians try to connect to the electorate through the same ideas of majoritarian politics, using a two party system that has its roots here and in the case of the Obama's 2008 campaign an openness to use new technology to get their message across to the electorate.



Bibliography:
• Ashworth, John. 1995. Slavery, capitalism, and politics in the Antebellum Republic 1 Commerce and compromise, 1820 - 1850. Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press.
• Feller, Daniel. 1995. The Jacksonian promise: America, 1815-1840. The American moment. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Meacham, Jon “The Change Agent. Our politics are rooted in the grand, complicated presidency of Andrew Jackson.” New York. http://www.newsweek.com/id/166828/output/print (accessed March 4, 2009).
• Pessen, Edward. 1985. Jacksonian America: society, personality, and politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
• Remini, Robert Vincent. 1997. The Jacksonian era. Wheeling, Ill: Harlan Davidson.
• Rozwenc, Edwin C. 1964. Ideology and power in the age of Jackson. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books.
• Watson, Harry L. 2006. Liberty and power: the politics of Jacksonian America. New York: Hill and Wang.

How and why did the Chinese and Japanese responses to the West differ during the nineteenth century?



The key issue here, how and why the responses differed, is important because it enables us to understand how the continuing process of industrialisation is effected by both internal and external pressures. This matters because the processes of
industrialisation is still ongoing and having a better understanding of the past will lead us into making better decisions in the future. So to answer this question we shall look at the different responses to the West's encroachment into these nations, first the Chinese and then the Japanese, while analysing the social, cultural and political factors that had such a profound effect on the outcomes.

China's initial encounters with the west came as early as 1514, but by this time it was a self sufficient centralized state (Fairbank 1979:151) due to its regional dominance and trade ties created through the Tribute system (1979:160). The legacy of this cultural and regional domination led the Chinese to believe that 'China was the unique land of civilization' (Craig & Reischauer 1978:122). There was nothing that they could learn from the Western barbarians (1978:122). In fact they felt Westerners where no better than the Mongols and they had dealt with them by building the Great Wall of China. With this kind of attitude trade early on with the west was restricted to Canton (1979:162). The Canton System, as it was called, was problematic, but still benefits where enjoyed by all (1979:162). Unfortunately the status quo would not remain. Chinese domestic problems where just starting to emerge and these would have serious repercussions

The main problem in China during this period was the stagnation of the Manchu Dynasty. The subsequent decline of this centralized bureaucracy meant it was unable to respond to a population explosion that saw a two-fold increase from 200 to 400 million between the early and mid 19th century (1979:173). The roots of this phenomena originate in the internal peace brought about by the Manchu dynasty. They took advantage of an increase in foreign trade, improvements in transport and most crucially continued growth in food production to facilitate the necessary factors needed to see a sustained population increase (1979:173). But from this point onwards the Manchu's centralized bureaucracy started to become the problem. Its disconnect from the reality outside Peking meant policy was slow to respond, with one particular problem being that of the tax code (1979:174). The Manchu's inaction in regards to the tax code and the changing demographics had a drastic effect on the public purse. The reduction in government revenue and expenditure expedited the decline of institutions they had been created to maintain social order and stability. Of the many social problems this created the one that is of importance here is the surge in opium addiction.

Opium had a detrimental effect for several reasons. First for the Chinese the illicit trade in opium was not just aggravating current social problems but it was draining the countries capital reserves which led to an exasperation of wider economic problems (Harrison 1967:16). Secondly China's solution, suppression of the trade antagonised relations with western traders and this led to the collapse of the Canton system. By interfering with the trade of the narcotic the Chinese where hurting the British Empire at its weakest point, its capital surplus, and endangering its imperial mission of civilization. The actions taken by Commissioner Lin Tse-Hu, in 1840, to control the trade directly resulted in the two Opium Wars, with the subsequent result being that China capitulated to Western desires and interests in the region.

The Opium wars where an unmitigated disaster for the Chinese. For one thing it it could have been avoided but the decline of the Manchu dynasty had led to a situation where Peking was not receiving the information it required and so formulated policy based on the falsities it received from officials more interested in preserving the status quo (1967:30). In effect as Harrison (1967:31) notes this 'represented the growing degeneration of the financial health of the government and the people.' As a result of these factors the West forced the unequal treaties on china (1967:20). These treaties brought about a legal structure that had evolved by 1858 to a point where the West gained an upper hand against china in its demands for trade on its terms (1979:165).

These demands in general where not favourable to the Chinese but the most destructive was the 'most favoured nation clause.' This clause meant that all foreign powers shared the privileges that they leveraged out of the Chinese (1079:169). This diversion of income further compounded the situation for the Manchu Dynasty as now they had even less capital to halt the decay in the institutions tasked with preventing the social unrest that could lead to a fermenting and mobilising of Chinese society into revolutionary movements (1967:29). The first of which to appear in this period was the Taiping Rebellion.

The Taiping rebellion gained ground because it appealed to the poor and desperate in Chinese society by supporting the ancient right of peasant ownership through their agrarian reforms of 1853(1967:38). Unfortunately its nationalistic rhetoric put it at odds with the west (1967:39) and this was fundamental to its success, or lack of it, as the Imperial powers decided to prop up the Manchu Dynasty. The rebellion though did produce one development that is relevant here. To deal with the unrest Peking had given the provinces more power with the result that once this decentralisation was complete authority had shifted away from the centre to the provinces and the Manchus where never to regain it (1967:43).



This de-centralization led to the final disintegration of the old system but the problems that derived from the last century of decline where too powerful to overcome in the short term. It was not till 1901, after the third of the great shocks, with the restructuring of the Chinese state by the West that industrialization started to begin in earnest. Unfortunately by this time just across the seas the Japanese had emerged from their round of industrialisation to up surd the old order and become the new regional hegemon.

With the arrival of Western powers in Japan the reaction they received was rather similar to the Chinese one, initial isolation but increasing pressure from Western traders resulting in the signing of unequal treaties by the home nation.(1978:120). But unlike the the Chinese, Japanese society contained several factors that meant this position would not have such a prevalent influence. The first was the Japanese attitude to the outside world (1978:122). Where as the Chinese saw themselves as a superior civilization the Japanese, as Reischauer & Craig (1978:122) suggest, where distinct enough to have developed their own identity. One that, while weary of China, recognised a plurality of civilised nations due to the fact that they had learned from other nations. Entertaining the idea that they could learn from the West was not hard for the Japanese to embrace. Secondly as opposed to China's centralized bureaucracy Japanese society was still based on a feudal system unified under a shogun that was fast losing power to the 260 domains scattered throughout the country. This multitude of political systems resulted in a variety of responses to Western encroachment (1978:123) and unlike in China, the central authority here was unable to suppress the agents of change present in Japanese society.

These agents of change took the form of two domains, Satsuma and Choshu. As mentioned in the last paragraph the initial reaction to the West was expulsion and these two where no different. One example of this policy was the Choshu actions, while in the ascendancy in the spring of 1683, forcing the shogun into setting a date for the Westerners to be expelled. (1978:128) The subsequent display of military strength, meant to cast the barbarians out, resulted in military defeat, but it did reveal two factors: the lack of authority that the shogun held and the ineffectiveness of the Japanese defences against the superior military technology of the West (1978: 128-9)

Military defeat of the Choshu by the West, while humiliating, lead them to recognise the futility of their foreign policy but also and more importantly they realised the need to modernize their own military force and techniques (1978: 129) In the same period the Satsuma leaders also realised the same fact (1978:130) and possessing the necessary capital both regions embarked on a process of trade with the West (1978:127) that imported the technology and techniques required to eventually defeat the shogun and bring an end to the Tokugawa system. (1978:131)

With the end of the Tokugawa system Satsuma and Choshu as the two power houses in Japan led what Reischauer & Craig (1978: 134) called in 1868 an ''imperial restoration.'' This resulted in the creation of a new government headed by the Meiji Emperor. For now though it was largely a symbolic institution with power remaining with the samurai who led the revolution (1978:134), who still had a lot of work to do to meat the demands of industrialisation.

Two factors helped the new government go instigate change. To begin with the new administration was free from the attachments of tradition enabling them to institute drastic innovation. More importantly though the past 15 years of interaction with the West had brought many within Japan to realise that they required realistic policies that would help them retain their independence in the face of a foreign threat that was here for good (1978:135).

The new policies that where formulated recognised the need to match western military and economic power, and that to go about it would require a centralisation of authority so that reforms could be enacted (1978:135). The issuing of the ''Five Articles of Oath'' reaffirmed this believe and the direction of the new government (1978:135). The articles called for a establishment of assemblies for public debate, the removal of the old feudal restrictions and finally a call of adherence to the just laws of nature (1978:135).

What this last article meant in reality was that knowledge from around the world would be instrumental in establishing and strengthening the new Japan (1978:136). In effect the new order had moved from its original position of expulsion to that of, as Reischauer & Craig (1978:136) suggest, reinventing the ancient Chinese idea of 'fukoku kyobei' (a rich country and strong military) through western technology. These changes where successful for two reasons; firstly because the factions in charge of government, Choshu and Satsuma, where the strongest domains and they where able to co-opt the rest for fear of being left out of the new state being built (1978:137). Secondly unlike China where the Emperor was seen as part of the old elite system the Japanese emperor was not and this made it a lot easier for power to be handed back to a strong central authority. With a determined administration in place, that now had the requisite authority, the Meiji Restoration set about solving the domestic and foreign policy dilemma that where holding the country back (1978:144). Japan was so successful at this transition that by 1905 they had revised the unequal treaties, invaded China, formed an alliance with Britain and defeated the Russian navy.

In conclusion the evidence presented shows that while both nations where initially inclined to observe isolationist policies when it came to the West, Japanese culture allowed it to recognise the futility of this stance while the Chinese sense of its own superiority blinded it to the strength of Western imperialism. This arrogance along with the centralized bureaucracy of the Manchu Dynasty led to a stagnation of policy meaning that the Chinese administrators could not react to the changes industrialisation was bringing to the country. Meanwhile the feudal system still operating in Japan allowed a fluidity of political alternatives to exist that facilitated a more positive response to Western encroachment. This acceptance of Western technologies and ideas led Japan to not only industrialize faster than China but to become a power that rivalled any nation in the west. Though as we can see from events occurring in the world today it could be argued that China, since the mid 1990's, has re-emerged not just as a regional hegemon but in this time of global economic crisis possibly the one nation that could up surd America as the new global superpower.

Bibliography:
Craig, A. & Reischauer, E., 1978. Japan tradition and transformation. Cambridge (MA): Houghton Mifflin School
Fairbank, J.K., 1979. The United States and China. 4th ed. London: Harvard University Press
Harrison, J. 1967. China since 1800. New York: Brace & World

Why did colonial Virginians replace servitude with slavery?



The question of why Virginians replaced servitude, the system of locking immigrants from the old world into long contracts of service to pay off their passage, with slavery is an important one to discuss as it gives us an insight into the type of processes that would allow such a morally apprehensible situation to occur and hopefully prevent a similar situation re-occurring in the future. I believe that the primary driver of this process was the development of the tobacco industry and the demographic changes in England of the 17th century. This subsequently caused labour supply problems in Virginia forcing planters to make a long term economic decision, namely to replace indentured servants with slaves. There was other factors such as theology, racism and skill sets but these affected the choice of peoples enslaved, namely West Africans, and worked in combination with the above, as Ira Berlin notes (1998:8), to facilitate a transformation of Virginia from a society with slaves into a slave society by 1705.
After several years of disease, conflict and other hardships the Virginian colony and economy finally stabilised around the mid 1610's with the establishment of tobacco as its main cash crop (Woods 1997:71). At first the settlers recognised that they had two problems to overcome; that of land and labour (1997:72). The first problem, that of land, was easy enough to overcome as they just took what they wanted (1997:72) especially after the 'Massacre of 1622' gave them the necessary justification to expand onto the land of the indigenous population (1997:72). With this out of they way they could turn their attention to the second problem; satisfying the necessary labour requirements of working the tobacco fields.
Initially there was three solutions presented to solve this problem; Indians, Indentured servitude or West Africans (1997:74). First they tried to enslave the indigenous Indians but this proved to be troublesome for two reasons; they would run away and it did not make good business sense to enslave peoples that the colonists where trying to forge trading and commercial links with (1997:75). With the initial experiment with Indians out of the way they turned to the tried and tested English institution of servitude which they developed to suit their own needs (1997:75). This solved the problem and by the mid 1620's servitude was widespread on the plantations of Virginia (1997:76) and the need for slaves was not at this point realised. Unfortunately for the planters indentured servitude contained the seeds of the next problem they would encounter.
To entice people to agree to indentured servitude the colonists had to grant them the one thing they could not achieve back in England, their liberty, mainly through the promise of land grants when they reached the end of their service(1997:76). This meant that the turnover within the labour force was quite high and made the planters reliant on new servants arriving to replace those that had finished their service. Also the high proportion of poor whites from England caused many social problem, from discontented runaway servants (Parent 2003:57) to newly freed servants turning to insurrection such as in the case of Bacons rebellion (Foner 2006:53). These problems resulted from the deteriorating conditions for servants and the finite opportunities available to those newly freed from servitude. When this news reached England the new world did not appear to be as attractive a prospective as it had been in previous years (2003:56). In addition to this changes back in England, namely demographics, also started to hit recruitment to the colonies.
From the 1660s onwards demographics started to have a profound effect on the English economy. Lower birth rates, disease and migration where relieving the pressure on the economy (2003:58). With lower numbers entering the work force there was reduced competition in the 15 – 24 age range, those most likely to venture to the new world, and this was enhanced further with the Great fire of London in 1666 that led to boom within the building sector and the economy as a whole (2003:58-59). The attitude of the elites to the poor subsequently changed and as Parent (2003:59) puts it they where now seen as a natural resource and the key to profit in the newly industrialising economy. This meant for the first time the prospect of staying in England appeared to offer more prospects than emigrating to America. This was reflected in government policy that in 1680 saw the prosecution of merchants involved in the transportation of servants to the colonies and the encouragement of the slave trade from Africa to the colonies (2003:59-60).
The reduction in the numbers of servants made planters look at the economics of the slave trade (2003:60). This became even more crucial in 1681 as the tobacco price fell by 50% meaning that planters had to look to other ways to reduce costs and as Colonel Nicholas Spencer stated in 1683 ''..Blacks can make it cheaper than Whites.'' (2003:60) Fortunately for Virginian planters one factor that had initially made slavery an unattractive economic proposition in Virginia, demand for slaves in the Caribbean and the subsequent inflation of prices due to this, was finally changing. This demand had meant that very few slaves made it to Virginia but with the deterioration of plantations in islands such as Barbados, the dropping of sugar prices, over investment in the slave trade and the Royal Africa Company monopoly we saw an increasing debt crisis from the 1680s onwards (2003:69). With the defaulting of loans from Caribbean planters the slave traders started to consider Virginia and for the first time Virginians now had favourable economic conditions and a supply of slaves that could facilitate the switch from servants to slaves (2003:70). Now while economics and demographics seem to have played a crucial role in this switch there is also the question of how a society that was based around the ideas of freedom from oppression of the old world and liberty could go down this path of enslavement.
Here another line of thought crops up; one that suggests that there was a certain predisposition that the colonist held that led to the choice of West Africans as the peoples enslaved (1997:6). Authors like Wood suggest that this predisposition was a combination of views that the colonist brought with them from the old world. These
views and ideals where a combination of theology, that allowed bondage of those of different religions (1997:10), and previous held racist ideas of West Africans as strangers who were as Foner (2006:50) states ''...savage, pagan and uncivilized'' (Foner 2006:50). This combination of ideals fitted in with the aspirations of planters who increasing saw slavery as an institution that was becoming indispensable to them in preserving their liberty, I.E. profit (1997:8), and so they set forth enshrining these beliefs into law.
In the early days of the colony black’s legal status was rather unambiguous. So planters tried to incorporate their rights over slaves into law and by 1669 had achieved some of their goals, such as the right to do as they pleased with them (1997:89). From here they still had to clarify two things; what rights slaves retained and on what grounds they could appeal for freedom. To achieve this final eradication of black’s rights planters turned to Christian theology. There had been for a long time a link between bondage and those of different religions dating back to the crusades (1997:8). At the same time to prevent slaves using the same theology to convert to Christianity as a way to achieve freedom, the planters codified the link between Christianity and bondage into law putting a stop to this practise (1997:90). While the planters where convinced in their justification of slavery as necessary, they had a vested interest in this institution as it protected their interests, but this was not true of the rest of colonial society. Planters still needed to enlist the support of working class whites to fortify their hold over colonial society.
With the status of blacks now starting to be enshrined in law, based around old world concepts of slavery, they now started to infuse the debate with language of racism in an attempt as Woods (1997:90) puts it to dehumanises Africans. This allowed planters to evolve old ideas of religious hatred through the latter half of the 17th century into one based on race in an attempt to co-opt working class whites into alliances against the slave population (1997:91). While they may not have been totally successful in this operation, the lack of opportunities for poor whites led to them moving to parts of the colonies where advancement was better. This made it easier to bring the small groups of whites left into an arrangement where they became part of policing mechanisms over slaves (1997:90). With this hardening of racist views and solidifying of alliances of whites against blacks the planters finally codified in to law,
in 1705, Virginia's slave laws (1997:92) and the transformation into a slave society was now complete.
While the evidence seems to support the thesis that a complex mix of economics, demographics and racist ideology made the switch from indentured servitude to slavery possible. There are those who suggest that it was purely economics and demographics and not that of race (1997:81). They point to the fact that the experiences of early slaves shows that there was no predisposition to racism. One of the most famous examples is that of Anthony Johnson. Johnson was a slave who arrived in Virginia in 1621 and managed to obtain his freedom and land and was rather successful suggesting that racism and enslavement of West Africans was not conclusively on the cards at his point (1997:81). But as Woods (1997:82) counters, while slavery of West Africans may not have been at this point certain, there was racist overtones present in elite Virginian society. Here she points to Rolfe's references to blacks as 'Negars' as evidence of whites seeing themselves as different to blacks. While Ira Berlin also refutes this argument by pointing to the ambiguity of blacks status in law (Berlin 1998:44) and their initial equality with working class whites within Virginia's economy that allowed them this measure of freedom (1998:33)
In conclusion the switch from indentured servitude to slavery primarily took place due to economic and demographic necessities. But as the evidence show these factors took place within a society that had many other complex factors at work. These factors included ideas imported from England especially in the sphere of theology and previously held racist ideas of West Africans. So while the enslavement of blacks does appear to not have been pre-determined. When it became a viable way for planter elites to fortify their positions and hold over colonial society it certainly did not take them long to revert to racial stereotypes as a means of securing their liberty at the expense of others. Even today the divisions created in this period still reverberate. The zeal that the planter elites went about codifying these notions into law and the schisms they created between whites and blacks, which produced views of the latter as second class people in American society, in this period have had long lasting effects that we saw come to the fore in the recent US election. On many occasions we saw American whites refer to President elect Oboma as an Arab and someone that could not be trusted (BBC 2008) drawing parallels to the views that colonists held of those that where religiously and ethnically different to them in the 17th century.

Bibliography:
BBC, 2008. Obama outlines economic package. [online] (updated 13 Oct 2008)
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/us_elections_2008/7667772.stm
[Accessed 25 Nov 2008]
Berlin, I., 1998. Many thousand gone: the first two centuries of slavery in North America. Cambridge (MASS), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
Foner, E., 2006. Give me liberty: An American history. New York, W.W. Norton
Wood, B., 1997. The origins of American slavery: Freedom and bondage in the English colonies. New York, Hill and Wang
Parent, A., 2003. Foul Means: The Formation of a Slave Society in Virginia, 1660-1740. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press

Hello, well after a fairly lenghty absence I am finally back and even though I do not have time to add much I have just started university at Sussex studying International Relations and American Studies. So I shall be posting essays I write for these courses at a minimum.

Yo cheeba has started College this week, so i am a little busy especially as i've go a dubstep night planned for the 1st of November at the ocean rooms Brighton.


I will try to keep this stuff updated but the next few weeks look to be a little hairy.